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WHO'S IN CONTROL?: THE COURTS, THE LEGISLATURE
AND THE PUBLIC IN COLORADO'S SCHOOL
FINANCE.DEBATE

by Christina Burnett
and Drew Dunphy 1

INTRODUCTION
Colorado's school finance story touches on a number of themes
familiar to students of school finance litigation: a struggle between those
supporting greater resources and those favoring lower taxes; a shift in focus
from equity to adequacy; and the difficulty of fostering an informed,
widespread dialogue on school finance given the complexity of the funding
system. At the same time, certain factors particular to Colorado -- a seeming
conflict in the state constitution, a number of strict constitutional
amendments, and an unusually strong tradition of local control -- have
dramatically shaped the state's reform process. With a pending lawsuit
seeking to address the state's enormous capital construction needs, Colorado
appears to be at a critical juncture in its school finance debate.
Since the early 1980s, Colorado has seen three school funding lawsuits
and three Public School Finance Acts (PSFAs) aimed at resolving the state's
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Marshall, of"FOREIGN IN A DOMESTIC SENSE": PUERTO Rico, AMERICAN EXPANSION AND THE
CONSTITUTION, a collection of essays on the constitutional status ofU.S. territories (forthcoming
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education finance conflict. Although plaintiffs have yet to score a major
victory and no court orders have been issued, this legal process has had a
clear influence on legislative priorities and changes made to the funding
system. Legislative hearings and other localized dialogues about funding
reform have also had a subtle but important impact. Even before going to
trial, the latest suit, Giardino v. Colorado State Board of Education, has
already raised a sense of urgency among some legislators about solving the
state's school funding problems.2 In addition; advocates now perceive a
pressing need for a broad statewide dialgoue on school finance. Coupled
with the pressure of litigation, this momentum for a truly informed and
widespread dialgoue may prove to be the missing link in Colorado's search
for a funding remedy.

BACKGROUND
Constitutional Clauses and the Theme of Local Control
Many states would lay claim to a tradition of "local control," but this
philosophy plays a particularly prominent role in Colorado politics,
especially the politics of school finance. The strong orientation toward local
political control has made questions about the state's obligation to fund
educational adequacy even more complicated than in most states.3 The root
of :this tension can perhaps be found in the Colorado Constitution, which in
fact contains two clauses relevant to these issues: an "education" clause and

2

Addressing the inability of some districts to pay for construction, Senate President
Tom Norton remarked, ''Ifwe don't address this, we're telling the courts to tell us to do our
jobs, and that's wrong." Needy Schools Seek a Lifeline from the State. Legislators Debate
Involvement, THE COLORADO SPRINGS GAZETIE, March 6, 1998 [hereafter Needy Schools Seek
a Lifeline].
3

For more on the complexity of balancing local control and statewide adequacy, see
Michael A. Rebell, Fiscal Equity in Education: Deconstructing the Reigning Myths and Facing
Reality, 21 NYUREv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 691, 714-718 (1994-95).
2

an "instruction" clause.4 Article IX, § 2 of that document states that the
General Assembly must ''provide for the establishment and maintenance of
a thorough and uniform system of free public schools throughout the state
5
••• •"
Article IX, § 15, however, vests control over instruction in district
school boards:
The General Assembly shall, by law, provide for organization
of school districts of convenient size, in each of which shall be
established a board of education, to consist of three or more
directors to be elected by the qualified electors of the district.
Said directors shall have control of instruction in the public
schools of their districts.6
Parties on both sides of.Colorado's school funding debate have cited the
state constitution to defend their positions regarding how the public school
system should be governed and who bears the primary responsibility for
funding it.
Over five decades before Lujan v. Colorado State Board ofEducation,
the state's first fiscal equity suit, the Colorado Supreme Court provided an
explanation of the term "maintenance" in Article IX, § 2 that would seem to
place responsibility for school funding squarely on the state: '!The
establishment and financial maintenance of the public schools ..." said the
Court, "is the carrying out of a state and not a local or municipal purpose."7
Despite this clear statement of state responsibility, however, this precedent
has not been decisive in Colorado's fiscal equity lawsuits, and the tension
between local control and greater state funding has persisted. In its amicus
brief on behalf of the Lujan defendants, the state argued that "establishment

4
See Terry N. Whitney, Voters and School Finance: The Impact of Public Opinion,
publication of the National Conference of State Legislatures (1993) at 29.
5

COLO. CONST., Art. IX,§ 2.

6

COLO. CONST., Art. IX,§ 15.

7

Wilmore v. Annear 65 P.2d 1443, 1437 (1939).
3

and maintenance" -- in other words, funding -- would logically imply
control. It attempted to reconcile the conflict between the two constitutional
clauses by suggesting that while the state has an "interest" in public
education, it is bound not to interfere with the clear mandate for local control
ofinstruction. 8 Others, however, have argued that the state has a duty, not
a mere "interest," and thus must provide the funding to fulfill its obligation.
The value placed on local control by many Colorado leaders and
voters cannot be overemphasized. fu recent years, the Colorado legislature
has debated measures such as home-school credits, tax credits for "stay-athome moms," and vouchers,9 while in 1996 Coloradans considered but
defeated a proposed constitutional amendment guaranteeing the right of
parents to "direct and control the upbringing, education, values and
discipline of their children."10 In sum, an analysis of a "thorough and
uniform" education in Colorado remainsincomplete without an evaluation
of its relationship to "control of instruction" and funding. Both clauses play
equally important roles in Colorado's fiscal equity litigation and in efforts
to resolve the explicit tension between funding and control.

8

Brief of the General Assembly as Amicus Curiae, Addendum at 10, Lujan v. Colorado
State Board ofEducation,_ 649 P.2d 1005. The notion of increased state funding clearly makes
some legislators nervous about the loss of local control. In 1997, Representative Dave Owen
remarked: "It's the Golden Rule: Them that got the gold makes the rules .... We like to
micromanage up here [at the state capitol]. We'll tell them a lot more how to run their business
[if we pickup the full cost]." No Easy Answers on Tax Reform, DENVER POST, April, 21, 1997
[hereafter No Easy Answers].
9
Education Funding Divides State. GOP Meets to Chart Own Agenda, DENVER POST,
Monday, January 12, 1998.
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NEW YORK TIMES, Thursday' November 7, 1996 at B7.
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Colorado's Education Finance System
The state of Colorado made its first direct financial contribution to
public education in 1935 .11 Other sources of funding for public education
in the state include local property taxes and grants from federal, state, and
local governments for the support of special programs. 12 By 1977, local
sources accounted for 58% of school funding, while the state provided 42%;
The gap between local and state funding has continued to shrink since then.
Today, state income and sales taxes account for 46% of public school
funding, local property taxes and ad valorem vehicle taxes provide 48%, and
federal sources supply the remaining 6%.
In Colorado, the state and the districts share the funding of operating
expenses in public schools, but the districts alone fund capital
expenditures. 13 This peculiar feature of the Colorado school finance system,
combined with constitutional amendments capping taxes and spending, has
made it difficult even for some wealthy districts to fund new building
projects at a time when many districts are growing rapidly. 14 The General
Assembly has examined the problem of capital funding several times but has
declined to make any major structural changes. In 1996, the Legislative
· Council concluded that it would take $2.5 billion to address the capital
11

A practice upheld in Wilmore v. Annear, supra, note 7.
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Interim Committee on School Finance, A Brief History of School Finance in
Colorado, Staff Summary of Meeting, July 12-13, 1993, at 3. See also Richard A. King & Terry
N. Whitney, The Colorado School Finance Story: Traditional Values Shape Legislative Reforms
and Initiatives, 20 J. Eouc. FIN 372, 373 [hereafter School Finance Story]; Education
Commission of the States website, www.ecs.org.
13

One exception is a "contingency reserve" fund, authorizing the state Board of
Education to disburse funds to districts in emergencies. See Understanding Colorado School
Finance 1996-97, Colorado Department of Education, www.cde.state.co.us / stbroch.htm.
14 Interview with Lee Combs, defense attorney, Hafer v. Colorado State Board of
Education, April 1996. Mr. Combs cited the example of Cherry Creek, where efforts to raise
funds for capital expenditures were denied by the voters. See discussion of Taxpayer's Bill of
Rights, infra.
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development needs of Colorado's school districts. 15
Over the past three decades, Colorado's General Assembly has sought
to find a balance between equity interests and the pressure to maintain local
control. The three PSFAs it has enacted have ostensibly been driven by this
goal. In 1973, the state legislature enactedits first school finance act based
on the principle of district power equalization (DPE). Under such a system,
the state guarantees that for each mill a district levies, that district will have
a particular amount of revenue per pupil. 16 If a district cannot raise this
amount through local tax effort, the state provides the remaining revenue.
But while this provision raised per-pupil spending in Colorado districts that
would not otherwise have met the guaranteed amount, it did not ensure
either equality or equity, because property-rich districts could still raise far
more than this amount on their own. For example, in 1977, South Conejos
School District raised $5.90 per pupil, and thus was eligible for $26.02 per
pupil in state equalization aid. Rangely School District, on the other hand,
did not qualify for equalization aid but was able to raise $326.27 per pupil
on its own. Moreover, these two districts still bore inequitable tax burdens
regardless of state action; each mill levied in Rangely produced nearly ten
times what each mill South Conejos produced. 17
The state also set a property tax revenue limit for each district called
the authorized revenue base (ARB). However, as a consequence of efforts
to gain the support of affluent districts, the limits were set in a way that

15

Interview with Pete Mirelez, lobbyist for various school districts, November, 1996.

16

In 1977, this component guaranteed each district would have at least $31.92 per pupil
for each mill levied. The districts that could raise this amount on their own were ineligible for
the state equalization guarantee.
17

See School Finance Story, supra note 12, at 373-375; Kenny L. Ayers, Colorado's
Public School Financing: Constitutional Issues, 59 U. COLO. L. REV. 149 (1988); Carol Huber,
The Constitutionality of Colorado's School Finance System, 50 U. COLO. L. REv. 115 (1978).
6

mirrored existing inequalities in local property wealth. 18 In addition, all
districts regardless of wealth were provided with a minimum guarantee of
$10 per mill in state funds, an amount that increased each year. Research on
the impact of Colorado's district power equalization system found that it did
not significantly change the inequities in per-pupil spending or the effect of
local property wealth on available resources. 19
In short, the 1973 PSFA introduced into the public school finance
system several mechanisms designed to reduce disparities in funding, but it
did not eliminate others that worked directly against equalization. Parents
and schoolchildren unhappy with this compromise brought suit.

LITIGATION AND SCHOOL FINANCE REFORM

Lujan v. Colorado State Board of Education
In August 1977, 68 schoolchildren from 16 districts brought a class
action suit alleging violations of the federal and state equal protection
guarantees and of the Colorado Constitution's guarantee of a "thorough and
uniform education." Their complaint stated that:
Spending disparities among school districts, to the extent that
they are caused by differences among districts in fiscal ability
to raise revenue for education, are without ~y legitimate
educational justification and result in unequal educational
opportunities being afforded to Colorado schoolchildren.20

18

Richard A. King & Teny N. Whitney, Colorado School Finance Policy Issues: Past
and Current Reform Efforts 2. Paper presented at the American Education Finance Association
Conference, March 1994.
19

Id.

° Complaint at 11, Lujan v. Colorado State Board of Education, 649 P.2d 1005.
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7

The Lujan c9mplaint described the ways in which the state finance system
gave certain districts the ability to provide "more and better educational
opportunities, material advantages and ·facilities to students in their
jurisdictions than are provided by other school districts in the state."21 The
complaint also argued that certain districts "lack any meaningful local
control over the amount of money being spent on their children's
educations. " 22
The Lujan plaintiffs succeeded at the trial level. In 1982, however, the
Colorado Supreme Court reversed the trial court in a 3-3-1 ruling, with the
swing vote provided_ by an explicitly reluctant special concurrence. 23 In its
decision, the Colorado Supreme Court considered whether the state ought
to provide equal educational opportunities and, if so, whether this meant that
the PSFA must ensure equal amounts of funding among districts. The court
answered both questions in the negative, holding instead that a "thorough
and uniform" education was "available through 'state action' in each
district. " 24 The court did acknowledge that the finance system was "not
without fault," but suggested that the job of fixing that system should fall to
the General Assembly. 25 The court also held that the 1973 PSFA was
rationally related to a state interest: fostering local control. Taxing local
property, the court argued, provided not only funding for public education,
but also a means of ensuring that "the local citizenry direct the business of
providing public school education in their district."26

21

Id. at 1 42.

22

Id. at '1J 40.

23

By Justice Erickson. Id at 1025. (Justice Quinn, who had been appointed to the
Colorado Supreme Court by the time the Lujan appeal reached this court, did not participate in
the case, having ruled on it at die trial level.)
24

Id.

25

Id. at 1018.

26

Id. at 1021.
8

The concurrence and dissents in Lujan provided the seeds for a future
legal challenge to Colorado's school finance system on the basis of
inadequacy. In his special concurrence, Justice Erickson qualified his
agreement with the majority's holdings by drawing attention to two ideas:
first, that the principle of adequacy is a more appropriate basis for a school
finance system than that of equity, and second, that the -locus of
responsibility for the financial maintenance of the public schools indeed
resides in the legislature.27 The dissents in Lujan noted several additional
avenues that might be open to future plaintiffs. These included the idea that
the plaintiffs had suffered an absolute deprivation of an important interest
because of the inequities that arose from Colorado's levy and bond
limitations, and the notion that low-wealth districts lack meaningful local
control.28
In sum, then, the Justices of the Colorado Supreme Court agreed on
one thing: the Finance Act needed fixing. Deference to separation of powers
principles and to the idea oflocal control stopped them short of ordering it
fixed, but the opinion raised important questions about the extent to which
inequity was permissible as a necessary consequence of local control. These
questions would not go away.
Despite the plaintiffs' loss in Lujan, the case brought pressure on the
General Assembly to address some of the persistent inequities in the school
finance system. The subsequent revisions to the 1973 PSFA made some
gestures toward greater equity, most significantly by lowering the minimum
guarantee of funding for each district.:29 Nonetheless, this change failed to
eliminate existing disparities, since the minimum guarantee continued to
provide funding for all districts regardless of wealth. While the Assembly's
changes clearly responded to some of the concerns expressed by the
27

Id. at 1025-1028.

28

Justice Dubofsky also agreed with Justice Lohr's assertion in his dissent that the
entire public school finance system should be declared unconstitutional. Id. at 1030, note 1,
1039.
29

Ayers, supra note 17, at 156.
9

plaintiffs in Lujan, none of them effectively addressed the problem oflowwealth districts' already high tax levy rates and widespread inability to
provide funds for long term capital outlays. 30 ·In other words, these revisions
did not fundamentally change the existing school finance system.
While these changes were being made, Colorado voters approved an
amendment to the state constitution that had a subtle but pronounced effect
on districts' ability to raise education funds locally. The Gallagher
Amendment imposed a uniform mechanism for determining property tax
revenues based on assessed valuation -- rather than market valuation -- of
property in a district. 31 Assessed valuation yields far lower revenues in
districts with high growth and large amounts of residential property, a
description that fits great many Colorado districts. In addition, the
Gallagher Amendment sets the proportions of residential and commercial
property tax revenues statewide at 45% and 55%, respectively, and the
General Assembly adjusts its formulas every two years to maintain this
· proportion. In the years since the passage of the amendment, the value of
residential property in Colorado has soared, meaning that in order to retain
that 45% share, residential assessment rates have dropped steadily, from
18% in 1986 to 10.4% in 1998.32

a

Proponents of the amendment hailed it as a firm control on property
taxes and government spending, and the strong support for these controls
helped the amendment survive a legislative challenge in 1997.33 While

30

Id.

31

COLO. CONST., Art. X, § 15 (as amended in 1982).

32

Michelle Dally Johnston, Property Tax ReliefProposed, DENVER POST, February 5,

1998.
33

See discussion of Norton-Anderson proposal, infra. Several persons interviewed for
this article S'1ggested that the complexity of school finance poses the greatest obstacle to a truly
widespread dialogue on property truces, spending limits and school finance. Combs Interview;
Interview with Deborah Fallin, Colorado Education Association, July 1998; Intervtew with
William Thro, Education Division, Office of the Attorney General, June 1996. See also Dean
Damon, Dueling Rules Hurt Schools, DENVER POST, March 29, 1998.
10

Gallagher's relationship with school funding is more complicated, the
amendment has clearly made it more difficult for individual districts to raise
money for their schools. One superintendent has noted that if property
levies were simply based on market value, his district would have.enough
revenue to meet its schools' budgetary needs.34 In recent years, the
substantial population growth in Colorado has only exacerbated this
problem, as dropping assessment rates create a smaller pool of local funds
with which to provide resources for an ever-increasing number of students. 35

Hafer v. Colorado State Board of Education
Despite the revisions to the 1973 PSFA, many local schools were still
frustrated by the lack of resources available to them, leading to a second
legal challenge only five years after the Lujan decision. Plaintiffs in Hafer,
filed in 1987, alleged a denial of adequate -- rather than equal -- educational
opportunities under the revised 1973 PSFA.36 They argued that the finance
system failed to meet many students' educational needs and undermined
local control, violating the state equal protection clause and the "thorough
and efficient" clause of the state constitution. 37 To tackle the problem of
stare decisis, plaintiffs drew attention to Justice Erickson's concurrence in
Lujan, in which he had stated that the 1973 PSFA "barely" met
· constitutional standards, aswell as to a statement in the majority opinion that
the factual setting of the case was critical to a judgment about
constitutionality. The factual circumstances in 1987, argued the Hafer
plaintiffs, warr~ted another review of the Act.

34

Interview with Mike Kinser, Superintendent, Adams District 12, November 1996.

35

Johnston, supra note 32.

36

Hafer v. Colorado State Board of Education, No. 87-CV-2216 (D. Denver 1987).

37

Complaint at 4V 22(a)-(d), Hafer v. Colorado State Board ofEducation.
11

The Hafer plaintiffs vigorously denied making any argument in favor
of equal expenditures, asserting instead that the funding system should
provide revenue according to students' educational needs. 38
Their
complaint also included a rough definition of a "thorough and uniform"
education:
Although equal spending per pupil is not required, the State is
obligated to provide sufficient teachers, educational programs,
support staff, physical facilities, texts, supplies, transportation
and other necessities of public education to ensure a thorough
and uniform education for every Colorado child. 39
Plaintiffs drew particular attention to the problem of funding physical
facilities solely through local property taxes and asserted that the legislature
had repeatedly failed to fund certain categorical programs created for
students with special needs. 40
To counter the defendants' traditional identification with the interests
of ''taxpayers," the Hafer plaintiffs also included a separate taxpayer class,
alleging that the finance act unfairly allocated the state's tax burden since
low-wealth districts often have higher tax rates yet yield lower revenues than
wealthy districts. Such a system, they argued, denied poorer districts any
real local control and violated the "Uniform Taxation~' clause of the state
constitution. In combining the claims of both classes, plaintiffs' attorneys
attempted to cast the interests of schoolchildren and taxpayers not only as
complementary but as inseparable. This strategy also presented another way
to pose the issue of local control by asking whether taxpayers in districts
with inadequate resourc~s exerted any real control over providing their
children with an adequate education.

38

Id. at fl 9-10.

39

Id. at12.

40

Id. at,! 5.
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Defendants brought a motion to dismiss, which was granted in part
and denied in part by the Denver District Court.41 The court found, in short,
that Lujan had settled the question of uniformity, but not that of
thoroughness, leaving open for trial the question of whether the
schoolchildren plaintiffs were ''being denied an opportunity to be educated
in the public schools."42 The court granted the motion to dismiss the equal
protection claim but denied the motion to dismiss the taxpayer plaintiffs'
allegations of violations of the due process and ''Unifonn Taxation" clauses.
At the same time, the political momentum behind revising the school
finance act was reaching a climax. In 1987, a legislative Committee on
School Finance held a series of hearings in which participants identified a
number of pressing concerns regarding school finance. Among these were
the continued tension between state and local control, difficulties in funding
cai}ital projects, funding for at-risk students, the state's over-reliance on
local property taxes for school funding, and the complexity of school finance
formulas that prevented the general public from understanding the issues.43
At the same time, the impending Hafer suit and publicity surrounding it
exerted pressure on the General Assembly to revise the finance system. 44
This pressure culllllnated in an overhaul of the 1973 PSFA before Hafer
went to trial. The plaintiffs, recognizing that the legislature's extensive
revisions of the finance system responded to many of their concerns, decided
to drop their case. 45
41 Orders Regarding Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, Hafer v. Colorado State Board of
Education.
42

Id. at 1 2 (emphasis added).

43

See Committee on School Finance, Staff Summary of Meeting, July 22-24 and
October 26-29, 1987.
44

Combs interview.

45

Interview with Gregory Kanan, plaintiffs' attorney, Hafer v. Colorado State Board
of Education, April 1996; Interview with Bill Rosser, Executive Director, Colorado Lawyers'
Committee and plaintiffs' attorney, Hafer v. Colorado State Board of Education, April 1996.
Similarly, one attorney for the plaintiffs in the pending Giardino case has suggested that
a sufficient response from the General Assembly might lead them to drop their case. Needy
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The 1988 Public School Finance Act
The 1988 Public School Finance Act aimed to meet two principal
goals, both clearly influenced by the testimony presented before the
Committee on School Finance: the establishment of a foundation amount
that responded to the real financial needs of districts, and the creation of a
concrete, understandable finance system.46 The Act replaced the 1973
PSFA's version of district, power equalizing with a foundation plan using a
statewide per-pupil base amount. The Act tried to balance "local control"
and equity goals by moving toward a uniform tax levy in all districts while
providing taxpayer relief by reducing the burden on property taxes. It
guaranteed the per-pupil foundation amount, with the state supplying the
difference betw.een this guarantee and the amount raised locally through
property taxes.

J
In response to concerns regarding economies of scale and cost of
living differences, the 1988 PSFA classified the state's districts into eight
"setting categories."47 These categories were supposed to reflect
demographic similarities among districts. Although the setting categories
had emerged out of extensive hearings and reflected an attempt to respond
to widespread concerns, they met with strong opposition from those who
charged that the categories did not adequately address student needs. 48
Moreover, inequities persisted, in part because of a hold-harmless provision

Schools Seek a Lifeline, supra note 2.
46

School Finance Story, supra note 12, at 376-377.

47

These included: (1) core city (Denver), (2) Denver metro (suburban districts
surrounding Denver), (3) urban/suburban (population in excess of 30,000), (4) outlying city
(population between 7,000 and 30,000), (5) outlying town (population between 1,000 and
7,000), (6) rural (population center ofless than 1,000), (7) recreational (high property values and
cost ofliving), and (8) small attendance (pupil enrollment ofless than 150). Id.
48

Id. at 377. Many districts also felt they had been assigned to the wrong category.
Interview with Deb Godshall, Policy Analyst. Legislative Council, April 1996; Combs
interview.
14

and the length of time it took to phase in a uniform tax levy. To make
matters worse,the legislature never fully funded the 1988 PSFA.49 In 1991,
a coalition of teachers, administrators, school board members, and parents
pressured the General Assembly to pass a tax hike to fund the Act, but their
efforts were unsuccessfuI.50

The Taxpayer's Bill of Rights
As discontent grew about the 1988 PSFA and the legislature's failure
to fund it, th~passage of the Taxpayer's Bill of Rights {TABOR)51 in 1992
exacerbated these problems by making it virtually impossible to meet the
PSFA's mandate. This amendment to the state constitution has been called
"the most restrictive revenue and spending limit placed upon state and local
governments in. the nation"52 and is yet another example of the strong
sentiment in favor of smaller government and local control in Colorado.
Although one scholar has called TABOR "an 1800-word masterpiece
that very few voters read and literally no one understood,"53 the stated goal
of the amendment is clear: "Its preferred interpretation shall reasonably
restrain most the growth of government."54 TABOR limits state spending
increases to the rate of inflation plus population growth and local spending

49

See, e.g., School Financing a Quandary, DENVER POST, January 11, 1993.

so Tax Hike Urged to Pay for School Reform Act. Parents, Teachers, Others Band
Together, COLORADO SPRINGS GAZETTE, September 10, 1991 [hereafter Tax Hike Urged].
51 COLO. CONST., Art. X, § 20 (adopted in a general election on Nov. 3, 1992 and also
known as Amendment One or the "Bruce Amendment").

52

James Jacobs, In 5 Years, Is the State Better Off! DENVER POST, March 29, 1998.

53

Gene R. Nichol, Constitutional Judgment, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1107, 1118 (1993).

54

COLO. CONST., Art. X, § 20(1).
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increases to population growth plus the change in property values. 55 It also
requires that voters approve any new tax, tax increase, mill levy increase,
increase in the assessment ratio for a class of property, or any change in tax
policy that results in a net revenue gain. Voters must also approve multiyear financial obligations such as the issuance of new revenue bonds.
Before TABOR was passed, the Legislative Council predicted that perpupil spending would drop by 18.3% if the measure passed. 56 The Colorado
Association of School Boards warned against so complicating the ability to
fund public works and services that "[t]he cost of the election itself could
negate a revenue increase approved by the voters."57 Colorado voters
approved TABOR despite these warnings. Some have questioned whether
many voters even considered the consequences for school finance. Like the
Gallagher Amendment, TABOR enjoys a clear, brief, and attractive
description: lower taxes and smaller government. According to one
analysis, "[f]ew arguments on either side of the issue stressed implications
for the state's puolic school children; the battle was fought in terms of
government efficiencies." 58
-The same year that Colorado's voters passed TABOR, they rejected
Governor Romer's "Children First" initiative, a proposal to raise sales taxes
by 1% (from 3% to 4%) in order to close a shortfall in school funding of
$168 million.59 Governor Romer traveled the state trying to garner support
for the measure, meeting with parents and educators to warn them of an

ss See School Finance Story, supra note 12, at 380-382; Nichol, supra note 53, at 11181119; Jacobs, supra note 52.
56

Even though the state's revenue projections improved and the General Assembly
allocated more funds than expected to education, the Colorado Department of Education
nevertheless reported a 4% reduction in per-pupil spending in 1994.
~

.

51

School Findnce Story, supra note_ 12, at 381, quoting Election '92 Fact Sheet:
Amendment #1 -- Tax Limitation (Colorado Association of School Boards).
S8

Id.

59

School Finance Story at 27-32.
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impending 12% cut in funding for most school districts. Although "Children
First" sought only to restore funding to then-current levels rather than to
raise the level of support, 56% of Coloradans voted against it.
Once again, the pressure to revise the finance system itself began to
build. The Colorado Lawyers' Committee, which had brought both the
Lujan and Hafer lawsuits, made known its renewed scrutiny of school
finance issues in light of TABOR.60 Another legislative Committee on
School Finance met in 1993, held hearings, and recommended new changes
to the 1988 PSFA.61 Among the participants in those hearings, which took
place all over the state and gathered extensive testimony, were educators,
districts, parents, community organizations and parental groups, businesses,
the Colorado Association of School Boards {CASB) and the Colorado
Association of School Executives (CASE). 62 Not surprisingly, the recurring
theme of these hearings concerned the potential effects of TABOR on school
funding and the need to balance tax and fiscal policy with school finance
decisions. The result was the 1994 PSFA.

Thi 1994 Public School Finance Act:
A Revised Foundation Plan
The 1994 PSFA maintained the 1988 Act's foundation plan but
instituted several measures for achieving greater equity. The Act eliminated
the setting categories and added four cost-adjustment factors in an effort to
respond to each district's individual characteristics and needs.63 In addition,
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it changed the calculation of the pupil count, basing it on enrollment rather
than attendance.

In an effort to promote equity, the 1994 PSFA continued the phase-in
of property tax leveling and required districts that could raise more than the
total program funding amount to use local revenue to pay for programs that
would otherwise receive state categorical :funding.64 However, the 1994 Act
retained a hold-harmless provision and a minimum guarantee, both of which
undermined the equity provisions. 65 The Act also increased the percentage
of additional funding each district may raise through voter-approved
property taxes. 66 Importantly, the 1994 PSFA failed to address the inability
of local districts to fund their capital expenditures, for which the districts
were still fully responsible. This issue -- and the impact of TABOR and the
Gallagher Amendment -- would begin to take center stage in the years that
followed.

A "NEXT WAVE" IN COLORADO SCHOOL FINANCE
LAW AND LITIGATION
The Norton-Anderson Proposal
During the 1997 legislative session, the General Assembly debated
(albeit briefly) an extensive overhaul of Colorado's school finance system.
issue that was extensively debated at the hearings of the Committee on School Finance.
Godshall Interview.
64
These programs include: exceptional students' education, vocational education, preschool programs, English-language proficiency, and transportation. See School Finance Story,
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House Majority Leader Norma Anderson and Senate President Tom Norton,
both Republicans, proposed a bill to end the reliance on local property taxes
for public school funding, and instead to fund schools through an increase
in the sales and corporate income taxes. 67 An accompanying constitutional
amendment would have effectively eliminated the Gallagher Amendment,
freezing the assessment rate at 9%. 68 The Norton-Anderson bill was an
attempt to respond to a key problem in the wake of TABOR and the
Gallagher Amendment: property taxes had not kept pace with inflation or
population growth, and many districts could not possibly meet their
construction and capital maintenance needs. Critics charged, however, that
the proposed system would provide sufficient revenue only when the
economy was booming, and not during recessionary periods. 69
Perhaps more important than the bill itself was the recognition it
sparked of the need for a statewide public dialogue on the question of school
funding. "School finance reform ..." read one editorial in the Denver Post,
"had a late start and is too important, and too complex, for the hasty
negotiations that characterize the final two weeks of the [legislative]
session. " 70 Others concurred, noting that "[I]nformal talks and capitol
hearings can't substitute for full public hearings in a wide range of Colorado
communities."71 Once again, much of the debate on the proposed overhaul
focused on local control -- and, in particular, the connection between control
and funding. One news report listed the ''vital questions" that must be
answered before the passage of such a bill, among them: "Will replacing
locally derived property taxes with state-collected taxes to fund public
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schools end local control?"72 Another editorial asked, "Sure, local control
of schools would remain in the state constitution, but if the state is paying
the piper, would local control continue in fact?''73

Giardino v. Colorado State Board of Education
In 1998, Colorado saw the filing of a third school finance lawsuit. The
Giardino suit, filed by parents, students and taxpayers in a number of rural
counties, combines Hafer's emphasis on adequacy and the inclusion of a
taxpayer plaintiff class with a direct challenge to the state's practice of
making local districts fund construction and capital maintenance needs. 74 In
this way, the Giardino plaintiffs have attempted to tie the somewhat abstract
claim of inadequate educational opportunity to more concrete claims
concerning dilapidated buildings and facilities. Plaintiffs also contend that
the current capital funding system does not promote local control but
actually subverts it. 75 They argue that the current system:
does not depend on the decision by tax.payers residing in one
district to tax themselves at a higher rate than that elected by
taxpayers in another district, but rather involves a decision by
the State that the taxpayer class members must submit to a
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heavier tax burden than that borne· by similarly situated
taxpayers in other districts in order to meet the State's
obligation to provide minimally adequate educational
facilities. 76
This argument is based not only on many districts' inability to raise enough
money for capital funding, but also on the very existence of a state
regulatory scheme that limits local control. As examples, plaintiffs cite
statutes that establish standards for school building construction and others
that limit the amount of school districts' bonded indebtedness. 77
Defendants brought a motion to dismiss the various claims in the case,
charging that local control is a legitimate state purpose (a claim not
contested by plaintiffs). They also argued that the plaintiffs' claim that the
school finance system subverts local control, and thus renders the system
unconstitutional, had already been rejected in Lujan. In February 1999,
three of the four claims in the motion were rejected by the Denver District
Court; only the claim of the tax:payer plaintiff class was dismissed. The case
will now proceed through discovery, with a trial perhaps taking place late in
the year 2000.
Although Giardino primarily concerns capital funding, some have
suggested that the implications of the case may be wider. One advocate on
the issue, Superintendent Peg Portscheller of the Lake County school
district, has suggested that the issue of capital funding cannot be addressed
in isolation, since the school finance system as a whole is undermining
adequacy.78 The trial, then, may present yet another opportunity for school
funding advocates to challenge Colorado's entire education finance system,
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Interview with Peg Portscheller, Superintendent, Lake County School District, March
29, 1999. Ms. PortscheIler has been a leading spokesperson on behalf of plaintiff districts.
Lake County has some of the most pronounced construction and maintenance needs in the state.
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as well as TABOR and the Gallagher amendment. Ms. Portscheller calls the
combined effect of these amendments the "real frustration" in ·trying to
achieve adequacy, and she suggests that Giardino may be "a judicial
opportunity to push against those amendments. The legislature has a .
constitutional obligation and the amendments really hamper their ability to
fulfill that obligation. "79

Recent Legislative Developments and Referendum B
At the same time, recent legislative events have further pushed the
capital construction issue into the public eye. During the 1998 session, the
General Assembly signed into law a bill establishing a school construction
and renovation fund to provide matching construction funds to districts in
need. 80 In the fall of 1998, Coloradans considered a measure that would
have earmarked a large part of the state's budget surplus for public
education. Referendum B proposed spending $100 million of the state's
projected $536 million budget surplus on building and construction needs
for schools; it would have also committed the state to that level of spending
for each of the next four years. 81 In addition, the referendum would have
earmarked $100 million annually for transportation, largely highway
construction, for a total of $1 billion in spending over the next five years.
Under TABOR, voters must approve spending any budget surplus;
otherwise, the money must be refunded to the taxpayers. In September, two
Republican legislators introduced a bill providing for the refund which
included specific figures comparing the refund those in different tax brackets
would receive if the referendum passed and if it was defeated.
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education finance system.
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Referendum B did stir up some public debate regarding taxes, school
funding, and local control in Colorado. At a September rally on the steps of
the state capitol, backers of the ballot issue faced a group of rowdy hecklers
who called ·Referendum B a $1 billion tax increase. In the following
months, supporters claimed there was an inherent logic in the proposal: the
referendum would use the money generated by Colorado's population and
business growth to fix the problems created by that growtlt. Critics,
however, characterized the measure as vague because it did not name
particular schools or projects that would receive additional funds. 82 Despite
polls showing that 72% of voters supported the referendum, the proposal
was soundly defeated, with 62% voting against increased state spending in
favor of a greater tax refund. In hindsight, some have suggested that the
education community did not do enough to support the proposal.83 The fact
that Referendum B asked voters to approve increased state spending may
also have been a key factor. Since 1992, 325 of356 ballot propositions to
spend local surplus revenue have been approved by voters, including 15 of
19 in 1998.84 In light of the defeat of Referendum B, these numbers suggest
that Colorado voters are much more comfortable with government spending
by local officials-- perhaps another way to understand the state's tradition
of local control.
Also in November, Coloradans elected Bill Owens, the state's first
Republican Governor in 24 years. Although Owens campaigned against
incre~ed state spending on education, he has recently proposed using 40%
of the state's $2.6 billion settlement with the tobacco industry on third-grade
reading programs and school construction projects. Owens' plan would
create a $380 million "21st Century Fund" to provide grants and low-interest

82 Ricky Young, Surplus Use Booed at Rally, DENVER POST, September 23, 1999; Roy
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loans for construction and repairs; the fund's board, whose membership has
not been detennined, would decide which districts received the grants and
loans. Owens has stated publicly that he hopes the fund will head off the
challenge to the state aid system posed by Giardino. 85 Critics, however,
have been quick to point out that even if this money is distributed fairly, it
would only be a small first step toward solving the enormous capital needs
in some Colorado districts. 86

PUBLIC DIALOGUE ON SCHOOL FINANCE
Coloradans seem to have engaged in several parallel dialogues on
school finance which may be moving toward greater coordination, although
public discussions on related issues have not always addressed the
implications for school finance. This is particularly true of the public
dialogue surrounding measures such as the Gallagher Amendment and
TABOR, where the discussion has largely focused on cutting taxes and not
on the implications for public school funding.
One dialogue on school finance has taken place at the Colorado
Lawyers' Committee (CLC), a non-profit organization with a membership
of about 1,200 lawyers whose work includes impact litigation and advocacy
efforts on issues such as foster care, child welfare, voting rights, hate crimes,
and education. 87 William Thro of the Education Division of the office of the
Attorney General has called the CLC the most active force behind fiscal
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equity efforts in Colorado.88 The CLC brought the Lujan lawsuit after it was
approached by the Chicano Education Project, an organization that had been
active lobbyists and litigants on bilingual educational issues, for help on its
own efforts to address the issue of school finance. 89 The CLC was also
behind the Hafer lawsuit and now provides the lawyers for the Giardino
plaintiffs.90 The CLC enjoys a solid reputation in the General Assembly for
building bipartisan coalitions. Indeed, prior to bringing both Lujan and
Hafer, the CLC organized task forces for building consensus and gathering
views and information on school finance, an effort which succeeded in
ensuring that no school district opposed the plaintiffs in Hafer. 91 The Hafer
task force met weekly for a year, hearing from superintendents,
representatives from school districts from all over the state, legislators, and
experts on school finance and taxation from Colorado and around the nation.
The .attorneys for the Hafer plaintiffs successfully communicated to a
sufficiently broad audience the idea that they were seeking not to
"redistribute" funds but to "increase the pie," thus ensuring broad-based
support for their lawsuit. 92
Various other coalitions have at different times responded to perceived
needs in the area of school finance. As mentioned earlier, a legislative
Committee on School Finance held hearings and issued recommendations
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that led to the overhaul of the PSFA in 1988.93 In 1991; a coalition of
teachers, administrators, school board members, and parents sought
unsuccessfully to persuade the General Assembly to pass a tax hike in order
to fund the 1988 PSFA. 94 At a press conference, members of thjs coalition
cited a telephone survey of 805 Colorado voters, which found that 71 %
would be willing to pay higher taxes to provide increased funding for public
schools, an optimistic finding called into question by the subsequent defeat
of Governor Romer's "Children First" effort and the success of TABOR..
\

In 1994, another coalition sought increased funding for public schools.
The Coalition for a Thorough and Uniform Education, which consisted of
nine school districts serving 130,000 students, issu~d a report on the eve of
that year's legislative discussions regarding the proposed rewrite of the
school finance act. The report called for greater equity and adequacy in
school funding. 95 Among other proposals, the Coalition suggested caps on
administrative and support-system spending, reductions in schools' social
service responsibilities, and the implementation of a uniform statewide
accounting system to allow easier comparisons among districts' spending.
The report stated that the Coalition's districts, which received about $3,800
per pupil (well below the state average at the time), were willing to show
that districts spend tax monies efficiently, contrary to popular perceptions.
Two years later, the Coalition reorganized and changed its name to the
Colorado School Finance Project.96 The Finance Project's current
membership includes the state associations of school boards and school
executives, the Colorado Department of Education, the Colorado Education
93
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Association, the Colorado BOCES Association and various school districts,
PTAs, superintendents, lobbyists and lawyers. Among the Finance Project's
goals is the development of grassroots support, local advocacy, and common
legislative agendas for long-term, adequate investment in the state's public
schools. The group has also sought to collect and analyze reliable, accurate
data on school funding and the effect of tax policies on the resources
available to schools. 97 According to members of the Finance Project, the
lack of such data has historically been a primary problem in Colorado's
school finance dialogue, since all sides play with the numbers to suit their
political purposes, and the complexity of the school finance system makes
it nearly impossible for the general public to evaluate and understand the
effects of different funding mechanisms. 98
In particular, the Finance Project has used the state's own data on
school district finances to demonstrate the impact of legislative and tax
policies on district resources, something no one else in Colorado does. 99 For
the past few years, the Finance Project has identified a "spending gap" in
per-pupil spending across the state. This research establishes the amount by
which per-pupil funding should have increased in recent years based on
factors such as inflation and enrollment; it then demonstrates the ways in
which TABOR, the General Assembly's failure to fully fund the PSFA, and
other legislative policies have caused actual per-pupil spending to lag behind
this predicted amount. In 1998, when the Finance Project presented its
findings to the General Assembly, no one disputed them. 100 The term
"spending gap" has caught on in discussions of school finance, providing a
useful shorthand for describing the problems facing many of the state's
school districts.
97
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With the filing of the Giardino suit, the School Finance Project has
increased its focus on the problem of capital funding. In addition to meeting
with members of the CLC to share expertise on capital funding, the Finance
Project has provided other support to the Giardino attorneys and helped to
identify plaintiffs. Working with local business groups such as the Denver
Chamber of Commerce, the Finance Project has also worked to exert
pressure on the legislature to ameliorate funding inadequacies before the
case goes to trial -- in other words, to raise a sense oflegislative urgency. 101
At the same time, the Finance Project has worked to promote a broad
statewide dialogue on school funding reform. The organization serves as a
means of collaboration for a number of interests -- such as superintendents,
teachers and school board members -- and tries to help these groups
advocate locally around a common statewide agenda of adequate school
funding. In many districts, the Finance Project holds regular meetings with
local school officials. With the help of the Greater Denver· Chamber of
Commerce, the Project has also convened regular meetings with local'--business groups. Expanding this dialogue to the broader community,
however, has been frustrating. While the Project has convened a few large
public meetings in southern Colorado, efforts to do so in other parts of the
state have been less fruitful. The Finance Project's leadership believes that
many Colorado residents do not yet see the problem of school finance as
sufficiently urgent to become engaged in a meaningful dialogue. Dean
Damon, the Project's Director, also points out that in the last five years,
Colorado has made strides toward.greater equity and the state's poorest
districts have seen a significant increase in funding. The problem now,
according to Damon, is "equalized inadequacy."102
In its efforts to expand the public dialogue, the Project has conducted
focus groups aimed at crafting a message on school funding that will grab
the attention of Colorado voters. The Project's leadership considers such a
public dialogue absolutely critical to school finance reform, both in making
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school finance important to the state's taxpayers and in making legislators
receptive to new approaches to school funding and tax policy. After the
defeat of Referendum B, the Project also recognizes the need for stronger
leadership in advocating for increased funding for education. 103 In addition,
the Project is considering whether it wants to undertake a statewide
campaign supporting an amendment to the state constitution providing that
school funding must increase annually by at least the rate of inflation plus
district growth. ·Such a campaign might, at the very least, provide the
opportunity to raise public awareness and advance a meaningful dialogue on
school funding across the state. 104

CONCLUSION
Despite a variety of obstacles,. including strict limits on public
spending and a pronounced desire for local control, the push for school
funding reform continues in Colorado. Some have suggested that a general
skepticism and lack of confidence in reform exists in Colorado, in part
because of the sheer complexityofthe issues. Nonetheless, the combined
effects of two lawsuits have brought about some reforms to the state's
school finance system, even without a major victory for plaintiffs. At the
same time, there seems to be a growing consensus among advocates for
reform that a statewide public dialogue on education finance is critical, and
that the moment for such a dialogue may be near. Perhaps the latest legal
challenge, with its focus on building construction and maintenance -- a
tangible and pressing issue in many Colorado communities -- will prove to
be the necessary spark for igniting this discussion.
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